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1. Adjustment and development 
When examining the literature on the link between short-term adjust-
ment policies and development needs, two rather distinct strands of thougth 
emerge quite clearly. 
The first strand is more dominant in international financial intitutions, 
in the governmentes of the developed countries, and also seems to have 
increasing influence within some Third World governments. As it is linked to 
neo-classical economic thinking, it regard financial equilibrium (both of 
internal variables and in the current account of the Balance of Payments) as 
a pre-condition for healthy development. According to this view, The restora-
tion of balance, once it is disturbed, is considered to have priority over all 
other objectives. 
The second strand of thinking is more dominant in international institu-
tions closely linked to the developing countries and among politicians, aca-
demics and public opinion in certain Third World countries. This view takes 
as one of its starting points a critique of the former position; it points out 
that excessive emphasis on rapid adjustment to financial targets often leads 
to unnecessary sacrifices of the broader aims which economic development 
implies. This line of thinking is based on the belief that, reduction of poverty, 
social justice and other targets (such as an increase in national autonomy or 
institutional change) have priority over short-term financial equilibrium. Alt-
hough this position makes many important contributions 
(some of which will be examined below), it usually neglects or underestima-
tes the fact that a minimum of financial equilibrium is essential, not only for 
sustaining economic growth, but particularly for achieving targets such as 
inscreasing national autonomy, which this position strongly advocates. Cl 
So as to analyse the link between short-term adjustment and long-term 
development, it seems useful first to define more precisely both the mea-
ning of development and that of adjustment. 
As became increasingly evident in the 1960s, economic growth was 
insufficient by itself to solve the main problems and respond to the aspira-
tions of the great majorities in the Third World. (2) Thus, today, development 
(*) This paper was prepared for the conference on adjustment policies for senior African 
Officials, organized by the World Bank, IMF and Commonwealth Secretariat, and chaired by 
Prof. Dudley Seers in London 
(1) These two approaches can be rather well illustrated by the changing nature of econo-
mic policies and development in Chile during the 1970s. 
(2) For a discussion of these issues, see D. Seers •The New Meaning of Development» in 
International Development Review, Vol XIX, N. 0 3. This paper reviews some of the main contri-
butions to this discussion in the 1970s, including the well-known IBRD-IDS study Redistribu-
tion with Growth (Oxford, 1974). 
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is. seen as implying not only economic growth, but also increasing satisfac-
tion of basic needs of the majority of the population, decrease in inequality 
and unemployment, and growing self-reliance. 
The concept of short-term adjustment to external constraints has also 
undergone important modifications, mainly in the late 1970s. International 
financial institutions (and particularly the IMF) have since Bretton Woods 
basically regarded equilibrium in the current account of the Balance of 
Payments as the main and proper goal adjustment policies for all coun-
tries. e) They have also considered till very recently that when a particular 
country deviates significantly from this position by going into deficit, it 
should attempt to reach current account balance very quickly (preferably 
within the period of one year). This definition of adjustment has been 
increasingly challenged, (4 ) mainly for the following reasons. Firstly, it is 
pointed out that the current account deficits of Third World countries are 
related to their need to finance development; for this most LDCs should be 
net recipients of long-term capital, particularly as it is the declared policy of 
the government of developed countries to assist the Third World develop-
ment through the provision of capital. Consequently it has been proposed 
that countries which are net importers o capital should reach a·greement 
with those countries and/or institutions that will export capital to them, on 
a long-term target for their current deficit; the adjustment process would 
then aim to eliminate imbalances inconsistent with their long-term capital 
inflows. However, so long as such proposals are not implemented, it remains 
true for a particular developing country-whether it is subjected to IMF 
conditionality or not-that is cannot sustain in the medium-term a current 
account deficit in Balance of Payments unless other countries governments 
or international financial institutions- be they public or private- are willing 
to finance it. 
(3) The International Monetary F.und's position is of great importance on this issue 
because, as is stated in its Articles of Agreement the Fund is the international agency with 
primary responsibility for shortening the duration and lessening the degree of disequilibrium in 
the balance of payments of its member countries. The basic concepts and models behind the 
Fund's approach to adjustment policies can be found for example in IMF- The Monetary 
Approach to the Balance of Payments, Washington DC, 1977. 
(4) For recent important critiques of the concepts of adjustment dominant in IMF thinking, 
see in particular (UNCTAD/UNDP The Balance of Payments Adjustment Process in Developing 
Countries: Report to the Group of Twenty-Four, Project /NT 175/015, and The International 
Monetary System and the New International Order, main document for the South-North Confe-
rence, Arusha, Tanzania, July 1980. It is also important to note that Fund itself has begun to 
publish articles written by its staff. which themselves are fairly critical of the type of adjust-
ment it has been implementing. (See, in particular, T. Reichmann, «The Fund's Conditional 
Assistance and the Problems of Adjustment, 1973-5» in Finance and Development. December 
1978, and C.P. Blackwell, «Reflections on the Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments», 
(IMF Survery, 20 February and 6 March 1978). 
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Secondly it is pointed out that the time scale in which countrie are obli-
ged to adjust their current account if too short. (5 ) Developing countries-
and particularly the poorest among them- have far less flexibility than the 
industrialised countries to redeploy their resources quickly so as to adapt to 
unfavourable changes in the international environment. This problem became 
greatly accentuated in the 1970s; as we shall see, in that decade an increa-
sing number of the balance of payments problems faced were caused by 
largely unpredictable factors over which particular countries had no control. 
In many such cases, the restoration of balance of payments equilibrium 
without a disruption of the development process requires long-term structu-
ral changes. A good example is adjustment to higher oil prices. 
Furthermore, the severity and rapidity of the adjustment required of 
countries in current account deficit implies a marked asymmetry with the 
indefinite period for adjustment taking place in the surplus countries. Because 
of this, the international system of surveillance tends to impose a deflatio-
nary bias on the world economy as a whole, and on the poorest developing 
countries in particular. Only very rarely have industrialized countries with a 
deficit in their current account gone to the Fund for finance (certainly the 
U.S. has never done so!); they usually finance their deficits through their 
own «rich country» network. Semi-industrialized developing countries have 
been able during the seventies to obtain private finance from the multina-
tional banks often without having to adjust within the IMF framework. The-
refore, given the current characteristics of the international monetary system, 
the more stringent and short-term adjustment which is a condition for 
obtaining a stand-by or extended facility from the Fund, are accepted mainly 
by the weakest and poorest countries, as only they have no alternative 
source of finance. 
The above dealt both with the magnitude and the speed of adjustment 
currently required mainly from developing countries with large current 
account deficits. Perhaps even of greater importance is the critique of the 
«monetarist» type of adjustment recommended by international financial ins-
titutions, and in particular by the IMF. When a country's imports contain a 
large proportion of essentials, as often happens in developing countries, 
payments imbalances will respond only to very large changes in total spen-
ding. Thus, while aggregate monetary tools may improve a country's 
payments situation, they often may do so only at great and partly unneces-
sary cost to the economy, both in short-term lower employment and produc-
tion, and in a decline in investment which limits future growth. A second 
major criticism is that the 'monetarist' type of adjustment-though claiming 
to be neutral as regards distribution of the burden- in fact tends to worsen 
(5) Some progress has been achieved in this area. For example, before 1974, countries 
were expected by the IMF to eliminate their current account disequilibria during one year. 
Since 1974, it has been recognised that many countries will require longer periods; the exten-
ded facility which operates during a period of up to three years, and allows a longer repayment 
period, explicitly recognised this. The desire to provide finance for more gradual and long-term 
adjustment has encouraged the World Bank to embark in 1980 on its new programme lending 
for structural adjustment, with much longer repayment period. 
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the distribution of income and consumption, due to measures such as 
reduction of state subsidies on assential foodstuffs and dismantling of price 
controls. This critique claims that 'monetarist-type' adjustment to balance of 
payments disequilibria therefore require unnecessarily large sacrifice in 
terms of present and future production, and that this sacrifice or cost is 
borne mainly by the poorest members of society. 
It can therefore be concluded that adequate adjustment policies have an 
important role to play as an instrument to ensure long-term growth, decrease 
in inequality and greater national autonomy. Timely and sufficient adjust-
ment to changing international circunstances is naturally necessary so that 
these objectives are not seriously threatened; however, adjustment policies 
must be as consistent as possible- and not contradictory as they often have 
been in the past- with each country's long-term development targets. 
The relationship between adjustment and development was very clearly 
brought out by Hollis Chenery at a recent Conference. (6 ) «The conventional 
separation between stabilisation and development, or short-term and long-
-term policies, has become increasingly inappropriate to the international 
economic problems of this decade, in wich the adjustment policies of indivi-
dual countries must be assessed over periods of five to ten years and are 
heavily dependent on actions by other countries. 
This observation applies equally well to the design of the long-term 
development policies. The countries that have fared best in recent years-
apart from oil producers- have been those with flexible economies that 
could adjust their volume and composition of trade in response to large 
changes in world markets ... In this setting it is misleading to consider stabi-
lisation as a primary objective in itself rather than as a means to a broader 
development goal>>. 
The close link between adjustment and development is also emphasised 
in the UNCTAD/UNDP Report on adjustment quoted above: «This suggests 
the importance, at both national and international levels, of placing the 
adjustment process in the broader context of long-term development strate-
gies and needs. A period of adjustment should be nothing more than an epi-
sode in a long-run process, and is therefore indispensable that the categori-
cal imperatives of the short-run should not be allowed to dominate and 
perhaps even overwhelm the requirements of the long-run. A mere reduc-
tion in demand may return the economy to its previous position, but the obs-
tacles will probably persist unless dealt with explicitly and directly, and the 
pressures will emerge far more as soon as the development process is 
resumed. 
There is therefore a need for measures to tackle the basic causes of 
disequilibrium and the long-run obstacles to growth along with the proxi-
mate phenomena of inflation and balance of payments pressure that accom-
pany them». 
(6) Comments on Krueger's paper, at Brookings Conference on Economic Stabilisation 
Policies in Less Developed Countries, October 25, 1979, Washington D. C. 
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These statements help us highlight a key aspect of the meaning of 
adjustment. The earlier view of adjustment stressed excessively not only the 
short-term but also the financial elements- both external and internal. This 
is clearly insufficient, as real adjustment implies changing physical patterns 
of investment, production, consumption and trade. It is these structural 
shifts which can be achieved only in the process of development. It is 
noteworthy that since April 1980 the IMF itself has stressed the <<Creation of 
conditions conducive to improvement in the supply of resources and broa-
dening of the productive base», as an important part of the adjustment 
process e). 
The idea that adjustment efforts should be placed within the framework 
of development planning is not new: in fact, it was expressed already in the 
sixties, firstly during the initial years of the Alliance for Progress. However, 
the link between adjustment and development has since the late seventies 
been expressed with increasing clarity and operational precision; further-
more, these concepts have become much more influential within the inter-
national financial institutions themselves- including the IMF. This may 
hopefully lead to important changes in the adjustment policies recommen-
ded to and pursued by developing countries. The large changes which have 
occurred in the international economy since the early 1970s, as well as the 
greater bargaining power of some developing countries will probably make 
such changes inevitable. 
2. Brief review of fluctuations in the world economy in the 1970's 
There is increasing consensus that the succession of drastic changes in 
the world economy that began with the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system in 1971 subjected the developing countries during the seventies to 
the most severe test of their adjustment capacity of the post-war period. 
Many countries faced current deficits in their balance of payments of 
unprecedented magnitudes. While an important proportion of these deficits 
reflected imbalances of domestic origin, there were major external elements 
of which the individual deficit countries were not responsible. Furthermore, 
even though these deficits were very large, they did not fully reflect the dif-
ficulties faced; in many cases, deficits were smaller than they would have 
been if the existence of disequilibria had not in itself caused reductions of 
output and employment. 
The evolution of the current account deficits of all non-oil exporting less 
developed countries in the period 1973-80, can be seen in Table I. 
(1) Source: IMF, .world Economic Outlook•, May 1980, Washington D. C. The proposal to 
consider the supply aspects of adjustment was officially approved by the Interim Committee of 
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(1) Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, Washington D. C .. May 1980. 
(2) Refers to all less developed countries which were IMF members and were not major oil exporters. 
(3) Estimated. 
The main sources of increased disequilibrium in non-oil exporting deve-
loping countries that were beyond their control were two: the large changes 
in the price levels of internationally traded goods and the recession in OECD 
countries in 1975 and 1976, followed in later years by growth rates signifi-
cantly below historical ones. A third factor, the impact _of which is more dif-
ficult to measure, was the growth of protectionism in the industrial 
countries. 
3. Alternative policy responses for adjustment to external shocks 
In this section we shall review the types of alternative policy packages 
with which different countries responded to changes in the international 
setting during the 1970s (stressing the more critical 1974-76 period), and 
attempt to evaluate their effects. 
Before beginning this analysis, two previous considerations seem impor-
tant to make. In the first place, it seems necessary to clarify that in dealing 
with adjustment policies it is often difficult to establish where scientific 
economics ends and political preference begins. As Diaz-Aiejandro points 
out in a recent paper (8 ), «judgements about the speed of adjustment in diffe-
rent markets and evaluation of the social costs of alternative dynamic pat-
terns are still based mostly on hunches and sketchy evidence». A certain 
eclecticism in economic analysis is therefore inevitable required. Undoub-
tedly, political preferences will have some influence in any treatment of the 
subject. All one can attempt to do is to make such preferences explicit. 
Secondly, it seems crucial to stress the differential ability of countries to 
respond to external disequilibria and to use certain policy instruments. Thus, 
the alternative of additional external financing- particularly from the source 
which grew most rapidly in the seventies, private credits- was not equally 
accessible to different categories of countries. The higher income developing 
(8) Diaz-Aiejandro, C. F., Southern Cone Stabilization Plans. Paper presented at Brookings 
Conference on Economic Stabilization Policies in Less Developed Countries, October 25th, 
1979, Washington D. C. 
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countries, whose past growth record had been good, and which had accu-
mulated relatively important foreign exchange reserves, were able to decide 
in the mid-seventies how much foreign borrowing they wanted to under-
take; they also were able t.herefore to reject any idea that the deficit in the 
current account had to be solved through a recession which would restrict 
imports. As we shall see in more detail below, Brazil and South Korea both 
had and followed this clear option given their easy access to increased 
foreign private finance. However, such an option was clearly not open to the 
smaller, poorer, less developed economies, which often had limited foreign 
exchange resources, and had to rely only on limited amounts of lending and 
aid. Therefore, the option of postponing adjustment to the current account 
deficit through external finance was not feasible for them. 
The capacity for adjustment itself is by no means uniform among coun-
tries. For example, there are marked differences in the ability to raise export 
earnings, particularly of manufactures or other non-traditional products, as 
well as to expand import substitution. Factors such as a country's size, its 
previous experience and level of industrialization, the availability of technical 
skills and of infrastructure, greatly condition the ability of its foreign trade 
sector to respond rapidly. There is now increasing consensus that since the 
capacity for adjustment varies from country to country due to pre-existing 
differences in economic structure, adjustment policies should be adapted 
accordingly; thus a major devaluation may yield quite different results in dif-
ferent countrie's, due to differential responsiveness of exports to such a 
measure in the short and mediun-term. 
However, a few words of caution are necessary. So-called export pes-
simism has certainly been exaggerated in the past and has been to a certain 
degree disproved by events. Thus, since 1967 the growth of exports of all 
non-oil LDCs in real terms has been quite researchable (with the exception 
of 1974 and 1975). (9 ) The growth of manufactured exports from LDCs has 
grown at a particularly rapid pace. Furthermore, several countries which in 
the past were commonly believed to have little export potential have dispro-
ved such views drastically; thus it is useful to remember that South Korea in 
the mid 1950s and Philippines in the early 1960s were almost unaminoulsy 
believed to have very little export potential! The implication is obviously not 
that any country could have had such a successful record of export growth 
as South Korea or Philippines but that were many more options open to 
LDCs than the export-pessimists were willing to accept. We shall return to 
these issues in greater detail below. 
As a response to external shocks to their balance of payments in the 
seventies, different countries adopted one or several of the following policies: 
a) running down foreign exchange reserves and obtaining additional 
external financing, 
b) promotion of increased and diversified exports, 
c) import substitution and/or direct controls to restrain imports, 
(9) For data, see World Economic Outlook, op. cit., Table 9 p. 91 
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d) demand management and/or incomes policies aimed at lowering the 
rate of economic growth. 
The first theree types of policy have in common one important element, 
which opposes them to the fourth type: they seek adjustment without sacri-
ficing growth. 
We shall discuss these different policy responses, illustrating them with 
the 1970s experience of specific countries, mainly that of Brazil, Chile, 
India, Jamaica, Philippines and South Korea. eo) A general point which 
emerges from looking at different country experiences is that specific poli-
cies may be adopted within different policy packages. Thus, export promo-
tion (which many claim to be feasible basically only in a completely 'free 
trade' context with almost non-existent tariff barriers and other import res-
trictions, such as the Chilean model pursuits), in fact has been successfully 
pursued not only by countries with such 'free trade' policies, but also by 
countries which protect their imports substantially by both controls and 
tariffs; in the seventies, South Korea, Brazil, Philippines and India all provide 
good examples of the latter case. 
We shall examine first the cases of Brazil and South Korea (with more 
emphasis on the former) as examples of countries which were able to sus-
tain relatively high growth rates, even during the critical period 1974-77. As 
was discussed above, it is evident that the Brazilian or the South Korea 
experience could not have been followed by other countries, with lower 
levels of development and diversification of their economies, as well as 
much less access to external finance. However, these cases seem of general 
interest mainly for two reasons: firstly, they illustrate how the adjustment 
process to external shocks can be both postponed and its cost in terms of 
growth substantially moderated when there is sufficient external finance 
available; secondly, it seems valuable to examine the policies followed (i. e. 
in the field of foreign trade) by those countries which managed to maintain 
high growth rates, at a time when they were faced with such large external 
constraints, and when in fact most of the world- both developing and 
industrialized -was barely growing at all. 
Brazil was in fact quite badly affected by the rise in the price of oil, 
given that it imports a very high proportion of its oil requirements. It has 
been estimatedC 1) with a rigorous methodology that, as a result of interna-
tional price shifts Brazil's losses in the period between 1974-76 (comparing 
with 1971 as a base) were equal to 4.5% of its G. D. P. 
(10) We shall use material from different sources, drawing particularly from recent •Cur-
rent Economic position and Prospects• documents on these countries. written by the World 
Bank and from Studies of the experience of selected developing countries in the 1970s, 
UNCTAD/MFD/TA/5, supplement to the report to the Group of Twenty-four. The Balance of 
Payments Adjustment Process in Developing Countries. INT /75/015. op. cit. above. 
( 11 ) Source: Studies of the experience of selected developing countries in the 1970s, op. 
cit. Brazil case study. 
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It is therefore noteworthy that Brazil was able to maintain such high 
growth rates during this period, even though its G. D. P. did increase less 











Source: Studies of the experience of selected developing countries in the 1970's, op. cit. Bra-
zil country study. 
The main mechanism used by Brazil to maintain these high growth 
rates in the face of foreign exchange constraints were: substantial additional 
net external financing, import restrictions and import substitution and, 
increased export promotion (12). 
The foreign capital supply (defined as net direct investment, loans and 
financing and short-term capital) grew rapidly from U.S. $5.5 bn. in 1973 to 
an annual average of U.S. $8.7 bn. in the 1974-76 period( 13). External bor-
rowing was so large that net external debt as proportion of both exports and 
G. D. P. doubled in value between 1973 and 1977! The contribution of offi-
cial external loans was small, as the Brazilian government preferred- and 
was able- to attract private loans instead. This had the disadvantage of 
higher costs, shorter maturities as well as the requirement of maintaining 
high foreign exchange reserves. However, the Government of Brazil seemed 
to feel that these higher financial costs were more than compensated by the 
greater freedom from outside constraints on their policy options. For exam-
ple, it was felt that accomodation to Fund conditionality, particularly in the 
upper credit tranches would have implied high costs in terms of curtailment 
of economic activity and narrowing of policy choices in areas such as inter-
national trade. 
Even before the 1974 balance of payments crisis occurred, the Brazilian 
Government had adopted a programme of more active import 
substitution- particularly in capital goods, petrochemicals, fertilizers, metals 
and energy. This programme was accelerated- particularly in the area of 
energy- as a result of the balance of payments crisis. Direct state invest-
(12) In a recent paper, (Policy responses to external shocks in selected Latin American 
countries) Professor Bela Balassa estimates that a) and b) were the two main policy responses, 
while c) made an important, but substantially smaller contribution. 
( 13) Source: Studies of the experience of selected developing countries in the 1970s, op. 
cit. Brazilian case study. 
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ment in these sectors, as well as subsidized credit lines to the private sec-
tor, were complemented by measures such as the progressive increase of 
the-share of local inputs required of foreign firms and 'buy Brazilian' proce-
dures in the procurement of machinery and equipment by Government and 
State enterprises. 
As the balance of payments problems became more critical in 1974, a 
set of additional rather drastic import restriction measures were introduced. 
Amongst the most important measures taken were the prohibition of about 
300 'superfluous' items, a doubling of tariff rates for approximately 1,200 
items, a 30 per cent increase in the rates for another 800 items and the 
institution of a 100 per cent deposit-refundable after 360 days without 
interest- in approximately 30 per cent of the import bill. 
As a result of all these measures- as well as of the somewhat reduced 
growth of the economy-the 1977 real of imports was barely higher than 
that of 1973 level. 
In contrast to import substitution and restrictions, virtually all of the 
incentives to exports had been introduced defore the energy crisis. Since 
1965, Brazil had followed an extremely active export promotion policy, with 
extremely successful results. Thus, Brazilian exports which had remained 
stagnant in nominal terms before 1967 (reaching U.S. $1.6 bn. in 1954 and 
only U.S. $1.7 bn. in 1967 grew at a spectacular pace to U.S. $6.2 bn. in 
1973 and to U.S. $12.1 bn. in 1977). The main elements of the export pro-
motion policies were rebate of indirect taxes paid at all stages of the produc-
tive process, as well as other tax incentives initiated in 1965, the introduc-
tion of the crawling since 1968 and the subsidisation of manufactured 
exports since 1969. Some of these measures were intensified after 1974. 
The South Korean experience of adjustment in the 1970's has important 
similarities with the Brazilian one. As can be seen in Table Ill, Korea was 
























( 1) Source· Stud1es of the expenence of selected developing countries in the 1970's. op. Cit., Korean case study. 
(2) Refers to values expressed Ln the 1970 Dollars 
rate of G. D.P. during 1974-76 (which even slightly above historical trends) 
and more than 20 per cent real growth in exports per annum in the same 
period. It is also a rather impressive achievement that South Korea's gross 
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investment grew more rapidly than G. D. P. during this period, the main 
explanation for this trend was the rapid increase in government financial 
capital formation. 
The main reason why South Korea was able to sustain its rapid econo-
mic growth during that period was that imports in real terms continued to 
grow quite rapidly, even though below historical trends. The increased 
balance of payments deficit was financed mainly by commercial bank len-
ding, total net annual foreign capital.inflow grew from around U.S. $300 
million in 1972-73 to about U.S. $2 billion in 1974-75, declining to about 
U.S. $530 million in 1976. 
In foreign trade, the main emphasis was on increased export promotion 
measures, which as can be seen in Table 3, yielded very successful results 
given that the economy's growth rate was not curbed, the level of imports 
was regulated through the rather sophisticated system of direct administra-
tive import countries, which has characterized the South Korean economy 
since the 1960'se 4 ). Tariff barriers play a relatively small role in this system, 
which is mainly based on quantitative valuations which are intensified when 
the balance of payments situation becomes more restricted. 
It should be stressed that even though Brazil and South Korea adjusted 
external shocks without sacrificing growth, their adjustment was very pro-
blematic in important aspects. Thus, although sustained economic growth in 
South Korea has implied a substantial reduction of absolute poverty, relative 
income distribution seems to have suffered a significant deterioration 
between the years 1970 and 1976 e 5). 
Furthermore, the rapid increase of both countries foreign' external debt 
in the 1970's has decreased lenders' willingness- particularly that of the 
private bankers-to continue lending at the same levels to these countries. 
It is thus increasingly doubtful whether Brazil or South Korea will be able to 
«know its way out» of the second wave of external shocks which began in 
1979 to the same extent as it did in 1974/1976. Furthermore, it is doubtful 
that these countries will be able to obtain large external loans, in the 1980's 
without having to accept greater external conditioning of their economic 
policies. 
The Chilean experience since 1973 provides a sharp contrast with those 
of Brazil and South Korea, which we have just examined. The Chilean 
Government attached first priority to adjusting the economy in the shortest 
period possible, both to internal and external disequilibria. Furthermore, the 
short-term policy measures it has used to archive this adjustment were 
extremely orthodox( 16); these short-term policies were linked to a process of 
fundamental long-term changes in the Chilean economy. The model has 
(14) In 1978, the South Korean government started a program of import liberalization. 
(15) For more details, see Chao, Hakchung and Kim, Daemo, Probable Size Distribution of 
Income in Korea: Over Time and by Sectors. Korea Development Institute, 1978. 
( 16) In several cases, the Chilean Government had adopted more orthodox measures than 
those suggested to it by the I. M. F. or World Bank. For example, it has reduced both govern-
ment expenditure and investment at a rate which is further than that recommended by the 
Fund and Bank. 
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been geared towards «Opening up>> the economy to international competition; 
thus, tariffs were reduced drastically from a relatively high 94% average in 
1973 to a level of 10% in 1979, the lowest in the Third World'. At the same 
time, the role of the State in the economy is being sharply decreased, as the 
private capitalist- both national and international- is expected to provide 
the impulse for development. 
Before describing the policy measures taken by the Chilean Government 
since 1973 to adjust and stabilize the economy, it should be stressed that it 
faced rather serious internal and external financial problem. 
When the present Government took over power, in September 1973, 
the annual inflation rate (measured by the retail price index) reached 360 
per cent; gross international reserves were at a very low level, even though 
the country had not played an important part of its foreign debt serve in 
1973. Several external and internal factors of great complexity explained 
these large disequilibria (17). However, within this context, it seems worthw-
hile to point out that attitudes to economic management played an important-
though not crucial- role in the creation of large financial disequilibria during 
the 1970-73 period. Diaz-Aiejandro's eal comments on Latin American popu-
list governments seem particularly relevant for Chile's Popular Unity expe-
rience: <<Even sympathetic observers warning of future dangers. due to 
excesses in fiscal, monetary, exchange rate and income policies will be dis-
cussed by the remark that <<now the economy works differently». Under those 
euphoric circumstances concern for economic efficiency, export-promotion 
and a minimum of concern for fiscal and monetary prudence will be regar-
ded as prima facie evidence of <<reactionary positions» not only by most 
Populist politicians, but also by government economists giving top priority to 
achieving structural reforms, or seeking a rapid transition to a centrally 
planned economy, or simply believing that economic efficiency, export-
-promotion and prudent fiscal and monetary policies are of little conse-
quence for the welfare of most people in the country». 
Furthermore, the Chilean economy also faced rather difficult external 
circumstances, particularly since the end of 1974, when the price of its 
main export product, copper, fell rapidly; Chile also had been badly hit by the 
leap in oil prices, as it imports three-quarters of its oil needs. 
Faced with a rather serious situation of both internal and external dise-
quilibria, the Chilean Government since 1973 attached first priority to adjust 
the economy in the shortest period possible, justifying the immense costs 
required as necessary and unavoidable sacrifices. 
The main mechanism used to improve the Balance of Payments and 
reduce inflation since September 1973 was deflation, which not only redu-
ced growth of output, but actually led to a sharp fall in the level of National 
Income and Gross Domestic Product. 
(17) For detailed discussions, see for example, de Vylder, Stefan 1976, Allende's Chile, the 
Political Economy of the Rise and Fall and the Unidad Popular, and Griffith-Jones, S. «A Critical 
evaluation of Popular Unity's short-term and financial policy». World De:;elopment, Vol. 6, 
N° 7/8, July/ August. 
( 18) Paper «Southern Cone Stabilization» plans, op. cit. above. 
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TABLE IV 
Selected indicators for the Chilean economy 
1973 1974 1975 1976 
% Change in Expenditure on Gross 
Domestic Product -1 .1 4.2 -16.6 5.0 
% Change in Real G. D. P. -3.6 5.7 -11.3 4.1 
Change in manufacturing production -6.5 -0.9 -27.4 6.8 
Average Unemployment Rate 7.0 9.7 16.2 16.8 
Sources: World Bank Country Study. Chile, an economy in transition Washington, January 
1980 and Odeplan Cuentas Nacionales. 
Chilean Expenditure on Gross Domestic Product had been growing 
during the period 1940-73 at an average annual rate of over 3.5%. As can 
be seen in Table 4, the adjustment policy implied a fall in Real Expenditure 
of G. D. P. of 16.6% during 1975, and an average decline of 3.0% for the 
1974-76 period. Industrial production fell at an even more rapid rate during 
this period. 
Unemployment, which had averaged 5 per cent in the sixties, and had 
fallen to 3.8% in 1972, grew drastically, peaking at 16.8% in 1976. The rate 
of investment (as proportion of G. D. P.) fell substantially below historical 
trends, as the decline in the traditionally larger role of the State in capital 
promotion was not compensated by an increase in private investment. 
The two main policy instruments used to induce this deflation were 
those most strongly advocated by the supporters of monetarist orthodoxy: 
sharp curtailment of government expenditure and drastic reduction in real 
wages. Thus fiscal expenditure fell by 40% in real terms in 1975, and real 
wages during that year were at least 30% below their 1969 level (and even 
more below their 1972 level). The sharp fall in real wages, as well as the 
increase in unemployment implied a dramatic worsening of income 
distribution C9). 
In sharp contrast with the Brazilan and South Korean experience outli-
ned above, the Chilean Government relied basically on the reduction of 
aggregate demand to curb imports; completely unwilling to use unorthodox 
pressures to reduce imports such as direct administrative controls, prohibi-
tion of luxury goods imports and/or increase of tariffs, which were so 
widely used during this same period in many countries. On the contrary, it 
acted in the opposite direction! In spite of the extremely critical Balance of 
Payments Situation, tariff barriers were substantially reduced (average tariffs 
( 19) For a more detailed discussion of the policies and figures, see for example, Foxley A. 
•Stabilization policies and stagflation: the cases of Brazil and Chile• 1979 in fLO World employ-
ment programme: income distribution and employment programme working papers, and World 
Bank, Country Study, Chile, an economy in transition, op. cit. 
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fell from 67% in June 1974 to 38% in February 1976!) and other adminis-
trative import controls dismantled during this period. It is noteworthy that 
such a sharp reversal of the policies which had been pursued in Chile for 
the last three decades was made at a time of serious Balance of Payments 
aims(Z0 ). 
The Chilean experience illustrates well the very high- and to an impor-
tant extent unnecessary-costs of an adjustment policy which places 
excessive relevence on rapid deflation implemented mainly through orthodox 
policies. The drastic and costly nature of the adjustment policies applied in 
Chile- as well as to a somewhat lesser extent in other Southern Latin 
American countries- have implied that they have been commonly known as 
<<Shock treatment». 
Chilean economic policy since 1973 has however been very successful 
in export promotion and diversification; thus, noncopper exports are estima-
ted to have grown in real terms by 150% between 1973 and 1978 (Z 1). The 
main mechanisms used were large devaluations since September 1973 
(which resulted in a substantial real devaluation of the peso relative even to 
the pre-AIIende period) and reduction of tariffs, particularly those paid on 
inputs for export products. 
Furthermore, Chile has obtained favourable Balance of Payments results 
since 1976. This has occurred not so much because of an improvement in 
the trade balance (the latter was very favourable in 1976, as imports fell 
drastically because of the recession; after 1976, as the economy slowly 
recovered past production levels and was <<Opened up», the propensity to 
increase imports surpassed even the rapid growth of exports). The main rea-
son for the improvement in the Balance of Payments, particularly since 
1977, has been the massive net inflow of private credits. Again, in this res-
pect Chile differs form Brazil and South Korea, the latter used private exter-
nal finance in the period 1974-76 to avoid a recession; Chile which obtained 
massive external finance at a later stage, was able to use it more to recover 
from the large recession provoked in the 1974-76 period. 
The most impressive sucess of the Chilean model is in export promo-
tion. The reversal of the excessive bias against exports which had characte-
rized the Childean economy for the last forty years had obviously been long 
overdue. However, as the experiences of many other countries including 
those of Brazil and South Korea show, it is not a necessary precondition for 
rapid growth of exports that all imports be liberalized at the same time (Z2). 
(20) Even though the international financial institutions clearly approved of the import 
liberalization, it is interesting to point out that they expressed reservations to the Chilean 
Government about their timing. However, this Government's extreme commitment to free trade 
orthodoxy led it to insist on its drastic trade liberalization. 
(2 1) Source: World Bank Country Study, Chile, an economy in transition, op. cit. 
( 22) For a thorough discussion of some of these cases, see Diaz-Aiejandro, A. «Trade poli-
cies and Economic Development» in P. B. Kenen ed. International Trade and Finance: Frontiers 
for Research. Cambridge University Press. 1975. 
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Furthermore, the Chilean experience illustrates well the fact that the 
worst time to achieve a transition to import liberalisation is that of acute 
financial crisis, as the costs of such liberalisation will add to the disruption 
caused by adjustments to the crisis e3). In such a. situation of crisis, if it is 
though desirable to achieve trade liberalisation, it seems best to apply mea-
sures which increase the profitability of exports without a direct squeeze on 
import substitutes. Measures such as selective export incentives or reduc-
tion of tariffs on imported inptus for exports provide a good example. Once, 
and if, these measures are successful, the country will find its exports 
growing and experience rapid economic growth; then it will be in a far bet-
ter position to liberalise imports, particularly if it has an easier foreign 
exchange position. 
Several countries have in fact applied the latter type of strategy for sta-
ged liberalisation; one of the interesting experiences being carried out at 
present is that of the Philippines. This country reacted to the deterioration in 
its terms of trade in the period 1974-76, mainly by a substantial increase in 
private external finance. It also intensified the export promotion policies, 
which had begum in 1970; the main measures adopted were a de facto 
devaluation and a very comprehensive system of incentives for exports-
which included tax exemptions and deductions for exports, infrastructure 
and other Government support for exports and reduced tariffs for imported 
inputs of exported goods. (The tariffs system for other imports was barely 
changed in the Seventies.) 
As a result of export promotion policies, the level of non-traditional 
exports increased at a spectacular pace (from U.S. $41.6 million in 1970 to 
U.S. $304.7 million in 1976). 
Now that substantial progress has already been achieved in export pro-
motion, the Philippines Government has designed a programme beginning 
in 1981 which will not only strengthen export incentives, but also liberalise 
trade and realign tariffs. The Philippines programme of tariffs reduction will 
differ in several aspects from that adopted in Chile in the 1974-1979 period: 
it will follow- and not be simultaneous with- a successful export promo-
tion drive; it will be phased over a period of 5-10 years; it has resulted from 
a series of careful previous studies carried out by the Government. and the 
impact of liberalisation on <<sensitive» imports will be monitored to watch for 
major disruptive effects on the balance of payments or on local industries. 
Finally, the Philippines programme of export promotion and trade liberalisa-
tion will be supported by a programme of structural adjustment loans gran-
ted by the World Bank; this will have the advantage of additional external 
finance to compensate for any resulting increase in imports; it may imply a 
disadvantage in that the additional finance is provided by the World Bank on 
the condition that certain changes in industrial policy are being carried out. 
Until now we have concentrated on the broader macro-economic options 
taken by different countries to adjust .to the external shocks to their econo-
(23) An interesting discussion of this issue can be found in Wolf M. «LDC policy and 
export performance- some lessons of experience» Mimeo World Bank, Jan 1978. 
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mies. However, it seems also very important to discuss the emphasis laid on 
different sectors. Especially in countries with very low average income per 
capita, and where a large proportion of the population is near the poverty 
line, the evolution of agriculture is of great significance. The experience of 
India in the Seventies seems of great interest in this aspect. 
As is discussed in detail elsewhere (24), India's growth performance 
during the seventies was rather poor, as the increase in real per capita 
national income averaged no more than 0.5% during this period; undoub-
tedly, the negative evolution of extemal developments-such as sharpdete-
rioration of terms of trade- had a very unfavourable effect on the Indian 
economy, contributing to this low growth record. 
It is noteworthy that in spite of its overall poor growth performance, 
India has achieved very favourable results in agriculture during the second 
half of the seventies. This has made the Indian economy- as well as the 
poorest among its people -less vulnerable both to the external shocks from 
the international environment as well as to unfavourable weather conditions. 
During the three years after 1972/73, India had to adjust not only to 
the sharp rise in oil prices, but also to increased foodgrain import require-
ments resulting from the crop failure _9f 1972/73 and 1974/75. However, 
following the succession of four good crop years from 1975/76, the requi-
rement of foodgrain imports fell to negligible levels. Furthermore, the very 
bad weather in 1979/80 revealed the strength of progress in agriculture e5). 
Despite one of India's worst monsoon failures, agricultural production fell 
little compared with previous bad weather years, being maintained at a level 
which would have been a record only a few yea-rs ago. In spite of the 
drought-induced shortfall in production of foodgrains during that year, India 
ended the season with very large grain stocks, without any imports of food-
grains. The relatively small fall in output of foodgrain in 1979/80, as well as 
the large foodgrain stocks built over the former past four years of good har-
vest, implied that in 1980 low income groups in urban areas were assured 
adequate supplies of grain at relatively stable prices. The greater availability 
of grain and greater administrative capacity in the countryside allowed a 
large-scale drought relief and employment programme that successfully con-
tained the worse aspects of a drought in India- the sharp fall in income 
among the poorest groups in rural areas. 
Furthermore, available projections suggest the real possibility of India 
moving into a period of sustainable foodgrain self-sufficiency or surplus. If 
this comes about as a permanent feature, it would be an impressive achie-
vement of a long-standing goal of Indian economic development. 
The recent favourable results and projections in foodgrain production 
and distribution have been achieved in India thanks to large investments in 
areas such as irrigation, extension, fertilisation and storage capacity as well 
(24) See. in particular, Studies of the experience of selected developing countries in the 
1970s, op. cit. Indian case study. 
(25) The following analysis is based on World Bank. Economic Situation and Prospects of 
India. 1 May, 1980. 
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as appropriate policies over the past four years. Foodgrain pncmg policies 
have supported the investment efforts, achieving a number of objectives: 
price stability, protection of farmers' incomes and foodgrain self-sufficiency. 
Real prices of foodgrains and particularly rice and wheat have been fairly 
stable, except in years of unusual scarcity. The procurement system, while 
operating primarily for rice and wheat, has placed a floor on other cereal 
prices as well. Relative prices of foodgrains, fertilisers and other commodi-
ties have been such as to make foodgrain production and increased fertiliser 
consumption very profitable. 
The recent favourable Indian experience in agriculture seems particu-
larly relevent for very poor countries, in the context of possible large unex-
pected changes in the international environment. as self-sufficiency in basic 
foodstuffs makes the satisfaction of the basic needs of the majority of its 
population less vulnerable to those external changes. 
Finally, we shall look briefly at the Jamaican experience, as an example 
of a country wich in the period 1974-76 responded to the severe external 
shocks it received mainly by running down reserves, accumulating debts 
and restricting imports via a comprehensive system of administrative con-
trols; thus, net foreign exchange reserves fell from +U.S. $130.3 million in 
1974 to -U.S. $183.7 million in 1976, while the total outstanding external 
public debt more than doubled during that period, going from U.S. $308.9 
million in 1974 to U.S. $831.8 million in 1976. Measures of adjustment via 
monetary and fiscal policy were clearly avoided during these years f 6 ). 
The Jamaican Government elected in 1972 had as its main targets 
redistribution of income, reduction of unemployment and securing greater 
national control over the economy. The latter target. implied a process of 
important structural reforms reflected in a substantially increased state con-
trol over the economy, including the requisition of public utilities, greater 
participation in the bauxite, sugar and tourist sectors, and increased control 
over foreign transactions. 
The Jamaican economy is characterised by a very high degree of open-
ness, as measured by the ratio of foreign trade to GOP, which leads to a 
high sensitivity to disturbances in the international environment. For this 
reason, Jamaica was badly hit by external shocks in the period 1973-76 (the 
increase in the prices of oil and non-oil imports was particularly important). 
The effects of the adverse evolution of the international environment were 
compounded by the effects on the private sector's behaviour of the Govern-
ment's political position. Thus, the rapid decline of foreign direct investment 
and the flight of capital was mainly the result of domestic political develop-
ments; income from tourism fell due to violence and bad press; bauxite pro-
duction declined largely as the trans-national companies retaliated to the 
Government's radical policies towards them. In these circumstances, the 
(26) Detailed accounts by Jamaicans of this period can be found in Studies of the Expe· 
rience of Selected Developing Countries in the 1970s, op. cit., Jamaica case study, and N. Gir-
van, R Bernal and W Hughes •The IMF and the Third World: the Case of Jamaica, 1974-80» in 
Development Dialogue, 1980: 2. Accounts from the point of view of international financial insti-
tutions can be found in the World Bank and IMF reports. 
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Jamaican Government's lack of emphasis and postponement of adjustment 
to external disequilibria worsened the situation even further. For example, 
during this period, Government expenditure growth was far quicker than 
that of Government revenue, which led to a rapidly rising Government defi-
cit; in 1976, the overall financing deficit of Central Government reached 
18.4% of GOP. Although an important part of this deficit was the result of 
largely unavoidable political and economic pressures on the Government, 
undoubtedly lack of emphasis on fiscal and monetary management made 
the Government deficit larger; this had a further negative impact on the cur-
rent account of the Balance of Payments. 
As a result of these trends, by the end of 1976, Jamaica faced a severe 
economic crisis, as its foreign exchange reservs were depleted, its bor-
rowing capacity from private foreign banks and foreign governments was 
seriously eroded and it had used fully all the unconditional financing availa-
ble to it from the Fund. In this situation, Jamaica was forced to seek first a 
stand-by and then an extended facility loan from the Fund, which implied 
accepting drastic adjustment policies. 
As is well known, in March 1980, Jamaica decided to discontinue nego-
tations with the Fund. 
It exceeds the scope of this paper to analyse or evaluate relations 
between the Fund and Jamaica. Wath needs to be stressed in this context is 
that Jamaica's inability and unwillingness to adjust to external and internal 
shocks, wich led to the sharp deterioration of the foreign exchange situa-
tion, restricted its margin of manoeuvre and its bargaining position vis-a-vis 
the Fund; this implied, particularly in 1978, very drastic adjustment policies 
being required by the Fund from Jamaica as condition for its loans. 
The Jamaican experience has implications for any small, open, depen-
dent developing country which attempts to carry out a process of radical 
structural changes. In the present international context, such a country will 
find it extremely difficult to sustain for a long period a current account defi-
cit by relying on external finance; in any case, such a large level of external 
financial inflows may be indesirable, as it will make the country too vulne-
rable to foreign pressures. Furthermore, the country may face large private 
capital outflows from it. For this, even though it is extremely difficult, such 
countries must necessarily put more- and not less-emphasis on adjus-
ting their economies to external shocks. Both orthodox adjustment policies 
-such as control of real wage increases- and less orthodox ones- such 
as export promotion or import controls- inevitably have to play a very large 
role. Such countries should avoid as much as possible depletion of net 
foreign exchange reserves as an adjustment mechanism; in fact, if feasible, 
the maintenance of relatively high foreign exchange reserves will act as a 
protective cushion against probable net capital outflows resulting from the 
structural reforms and/or unexpected changes in the international 
environment. 
It is noteworthy that the particular importance of adjustment and eco-
nomic management in countries undergoing international change is being 
increasingly recognised, even by very non-orthodox social scientists and 
politicians. Thus, among the conclusions of the recent North-South Confe-
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renee on <<The International Monetary System and the New International 
Order», held at Arusha, it is stated: «Structural change generates imbalances 
and new policies may produce understandable mistakes as part of the deve-
lopment process. Under such conditions, self-discipline and coherent eco-
nomic management, including efficient planning and tigh administrative 
controls, become particularly crucial for the survival of the policies of 
change». (27) 
The Jamaican experience of the seventies, however, also highlights 
another crucial aspect: the inadequacy of the present international financial 
system to help relatively poorer, small, open economies to adjust to changes 
in the international environment, particularly if that country is undergoing 
important structural changes. The need for changes in the international 
financial system and flows will be discussed in the following section. 
4. Implications for the future of the adjustment experience during the 
seventies. 
Certain implications for the future can be extracted from the adjustment 
experience in the seventies, both as regards the international environment 
and the country responses to it. This is particularly true because many of 
the phenomena that occured in the early and mid-seventies are being repea-
ted now. 
The importance of a more satisfactory international environment to faci-
litate national adjustment, and avoid putting obstacles in its way, cannot be 
stressed enough. Of particular importance within the present circumstances 
is sufficient availability of external finance to attenuate the cost of adjust-
ment for developing countries. Again, recent changes in the international 
economic system- such as the rapid rise in the price of oil and recessio-
nary tendencies in many industrialised countries- have led to a further 
sharp increase in the current accounts of oil-importing developing coun-
tries. (28) There are increasing doubts about the capacity and willingness of 
existing private and official institutions and mechanisms to provide external 
finance to the same extent as in the last decade so that these deficits can 
be covered. If these deficits are not financed externally, adjustment will 
have to occur mainly through a serious cutback in the already low growth 
rates of net oil-importing developing countries. To avoid this, expanded 
financial facilities for longer term lending will be required. As the role of 
private commercial bank lending to the Third World can be expected to grow 
less than during the seventies, and continue to be oriented mainly to the 
higher-income Third World countries, greater emphasis must be placed on 
increased official flows -both from industrialised and OPEC countries. Many 
important technical proposals have been made in this direction, for example 
(27) •The Arusha lniciative», published in Development Dialogue, op. cit. 
(28) For 1980, projections, see, for example, IMF World Economic Outlook, op. cit. 
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in the Brandt Report. (29 ) These proposals include both calls for a «massive 
net transfer of resourceS>> from developed to developing countries, as well as 
channelling resources from capital-surplus Third World (mainly OPEC) coun-
tries directly to other Third World countries. Given the urgency of the situa-
tion, it is essential that the political will be found to transform quickly these 
proposals into realities. 
Whether these new funds are being channelled through existing 
mechanisms and institutions or new ones, the issue of the conditionality of 
lending may probably have to be reviewed. Undoubtedly, any lending will 
have to imply certain conditionality, but it must be hoped that international 
financial institutions- including the Fund- stress less the tradicional 
macro-economic indicators and more new indicators consistent with adjust-
ment in the broader context of a country's long-term development. Criteria 
on growth and income distribution would be very relevant in this respect; 
criteria which defend or increase the level of consumption of the poorest 
during adjustment processes would be of particular significance. The philo-
sophy behind the structural adjustment loans by the World Bank seems to 
be oriented in such a direction. 
Greater availability of external finance will allow more gradual adjust-
ment policies; this will avoid such drastic costs as the Chilean economy and 
people suffered under its «Shock adjustment>> during 1974-6. 
As was stressed in section 2 and illustrated by the country experience, 
adjustment will have to be more closely linked to long-term structural chan-
ges and development needs. This will require actions in sectors such as 
energy to which insufficient attention was paid during the seventies. Impor-
tant iniciatives need to be taken in the future to expand developing coun-
tries' production and conservation of energy. (30) 
Adequate policies toward agriculture will continue to have great impor-
tance, particularly for the poorer among developing countries. The Indian 
experience in the seventies provides a useful example of successful policies 
in this sector, which seem to have assured self-reliance in foodgrains. This 
was achieved mainly through an important investment effort and adequate 
pricing policies. 
As we saw above, adjustment is linked to foreign trade policies. 
Undoubtedly, the optimal policy which a particular developing country should 
follow cannot be defined in general terms; it depends fundamentally on the 
general level of protectionism prevailling, particularly in the industrialised 
countries. However, experience (here particularly illustrated by the cases of 
Brazil, South Korea, Chile and the Philippines) seems to show that, at least 
in the seventies, it was the export-optimists who were correct. Many coun-
tries which followed policies geared towards export promotion and diversifi-
(29) Independent Commission on International Development Issues: North-South: A Pro-
gramme for Survival. Pan Books. London. 1980. Detailed concrete proposals on finance are 
developed in a recent Commonwealth Secretariat Report: The World Economic Crisis. London. 
1980. 
(30) See the recent World Bank document. Energy in the Developing Countries. August 
1980. 
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cation achieved rather spectacular results. Furthermore, it would seem that 
countries, like Jamaica, which did not stress enough export promotion mis-
sed some opportunities to improve their Balance of Payments; however, it 
should also be recognised that possibilities for rapid export growth and 
diversification appear to be far greater in the higher income developing 
countries. (31 ) 
The experience of the seventies analysed above also illustrates that 
liberalisation of imports is not a necessary requisite for expanding exports, 
particularly during the first stages of export promotion. In fact several of the 
more successful export promotion cases (i. e. South Korea, Brazil and the 
Philippines) maintained quite levels of protection and/or administrative con-
trols. Furthermore, when they were faced with the major external shocks of 
1974-6, they increased temporarily protection through tariff and non-tariff 
barriers; this reduced their reliance on monetary and fiscal policy to cut 
imports, thus attenuating the sacrifice in output required. 
Policies which redress the balance of incentives between exports and 
import-substitution may be required in some countries. As becomes clear 
when comparing the Chilean and Philippines' experience a gradual liberali-
sation which occurs after substancial progress has been achieved in export 
promition is preferable to rapid import liberalisation during the initial stages 
of export promotion. The Chilean experience also clearly illustrates the 
undesirability of liberalising imports during a time of acute Balance of 
Payments crisis. 
(31) Thus, in the period 1967-79, the real growth of exports was much lower for the low 
income countries than for the rest of the non-oil developing countries. For data, see Table 9, 
World Economic Outlook, op. cit. 
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